

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**RELEVANCE OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD INFANTRY UNITS
IN THE FORCE STRUCTURE AND THEIR ROLE IN COMBAT**

by

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ABSTRACT

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Currently 55% of the Army's combat units are in the National Guard. The Army National Guard has 88 of the 159 infantry battalions in the Army's force structure. Yet as of this paper, only two infantry companies are actively serving in Operation Iraq Freedom. From the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 until April 30, 2003 over 202,435 members of the Army National Guard have mobilized and served on active duty in 86 countries. That is 58% of a total force of 346,848 assigned.

Such large numbers are staggering considering that National Guard infantry units are not being utilized according to their organization, training and equipment. These are the same trends that left National Guard Infantry units unused during the first Gulf War and caused tremendous friction between the active Army and the Army National Guard. The strategic implication is negative for National Guard force structure, resources, strength, optempo and equipment.

The Army National Guard is constitutionally the reserve force for the Army. The active Army consists of only 33 combat brigades. Most of those are currently in Iraq and Afghanistan or are redeploying home. National Guard infantry units are trained and ready to deploy to those theaters of operations and assume the role of the departing active units. The strategic situation has become critical for the United States as world-wide threats continue to grow in places like Iran, North Korea, and the Philippines, while the rebuilding of Iraq and Afghanistan is far from complete.

I recommend that the Army break the cold war paradigm and use National Guard infantry units in combat operations now. It would be cost effective to mobilize at least two Army National Guard Infantry Divisions for two years and use them exclusively in Iraq and Afghanistan. This will allow the active units to stand down, reorganize and recuperate. Lastly, mobilizing Army National Guard divisions would add flexibility to the Army as they prepare for potential threats from Iran or North Korea.

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RELEVANCE OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD INFANTRY UNITS IN THE FORCE STRUCTURE

Citizen soldiers have defended their communities since 1636 when the first English settlers landed in America. What is now called the Army National Guard has formed, trained and fought our nation's wars for over 400 years. The National Guard is by no means a perfect organization. Infantry units in the Army National Guard have had many victories in combat along with some failures. The relationship between the Army National Guard and the active Army has been long, complex, and sometimes divisive. Whenever the United States has called, both organizations have joined forces to obtain victory on the battlefield. What is at issue is the amount of resources (men, equipment and time) that are lost due to this century-long rivalry between the Army National Guard and the active Army.¹

The United States Army is currently engaged in a protracted war against terrorism. This war is being fought both overseas and here at home. The battlefield is both linear and non-linear and requires the Army to fight differently from any wars in the past. The Secretary Of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, has tasked the Army to transform itself from the cold war organization it was before 9/11 to an Army that is light, agile, modern, and quickly deployable anywhere in the world.² The requirement to transform the Army affects the active component, Army National Guard and Army Reserve.

The current Army force structure includes 159 infantry battalions, 70 of which are assigned to the active component. While 55% of the Army's combat power is located in the Army National Guard, over 99% of the combat operations conducted during Operation Iraq Freedom were performed by the active component. The small Army that exists today is being severely stressed, due in part to the reluctance of the active component to utilize combat units from the Army National Guard.³

National Guard critics most often state two primary reasons why National Guard combat units cannot be deployed; that the National Guard is not cost effective and post mobilization training is too lengthy to make them relevant for today's rapid and decisive operations. Related to both of the criticisms are several force structure issues, but the most cited one is that the Guard's structure is too heavy.

In response to critics, first, the National Guard is still the most cost effective means of defense. In FY 2001 the total Army budget was 70.8 billion dollars. The Army National Guard was given 6.9 billion out of that allotment which equates to 9.7% of the Army budget and only 2.4 % of the entire Department of Defense budget. Second, during Noble Eagle I and Enduring Freedom the average time for an Infantry unit to mobilize, validate and deploy, under the First

and Fifth Army Headquarters, was 48 days.⁴ Finally, of the 88 infantry battalions in the National Guard only 42 are mechanized, the remainders are light, mountain, scout and air assault infantry.

The post-mobilization training model that was used for infantry units during Operation Noble Eagle was based on force protection. Two infantry companies from the Florida Army National Guard's 53rd Separate Infantry Brigade (SIB) deployed to Baghdad and conducted combat operations, one being attached to a Special Forces detachment. In comparison, the 48th Separate Infantry Brigade (SIB) from the Georgia Army National Guard mobilized for Desert Storm in 1990 but never deployed. The 48th SIB was validated to conduct combat operations after 91 days of post mobilization training at the brigade level while at the National Training Center (NTC). A breakdown of the 91 days showed 76 devoted to training, while the remaining 15 days were for travel and administrative tasks. The 48th SIB achieved battalion level training validation after 46 days of post mobilization training, almost exactly what infantry units at the battalion level achieved 13 years later during Noble Eagle.⁵

I intend to demonstrate that Army National Guard infantry units are an untapped, cost effective and trained force ready to deploy as an element of the "Total Army's" force structure. These units must be used overseas in combat in order to make them an equal partner in the "Total Army". I will recommend how the Army National Guard should change its force structure to optimize that partnership and how the restructured forces should be employed to maximize their effectiveness.

HISTORY OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

The history of the modern Army National Guard dates back to April 26, 1607 when the first English colonist landed in Virginia. The English brought with them two philosophies from their home, a historical distrust for a large standing army and participation in the militia.

The term militia comes from the Latin word "miles" which means "soldier". The concept of the militia can be traced to the Greeks, who used the citizen-soldier concept to raise temporary armies to defend their city-states. The militia concept continued to thrive among the Saxons even after the fall of the Roman Empire. Eventually the Saxons in the 5th century invaded England and spread the militia concept.⁶

The Army National Guard's history can be divided into three periods. The first period was from 1636 (colonial militia) until 1898 (Spanish American War), the second from 1898 (birth of the modern National Guard) until 1945 (end of the Second World War), and the last from 1946 (cold war) until present (Global War on Terrorism). During the first period the colonial militia

helped forge our new nation during the Revolutionary War and solidified it during the War of 1812. The militia fought the Seminole Indians in 1836 and made up most of the Army that defeated Mexico in 1846. It was during the Civil War that the volunteer militia reached its high point in importance. Militias provided substantial formations of combat troops, and suffered the greatest casualties ever experienced by the United States. After the devastating losses during the Civil War, the United States Army shrank to a small standing formation until the Spanish American War in 1898.⁷

The Spanish American War was the defining moment in the history of the National Guard. In 1898 the active Army consisted of only 28,000 men. President William McKinley notified the states' Governors to assemble an additional 125,000 men from their respective militias to augment the standing army. Eventually National Guard volunteers numbered 187,687 men. One of the most famous units of the war was the "Rough Riders". This unit was from the New Mexico and Arizona National Guard, under the command of LTC Theodore Roosevelt, himself a former National Guardsman from New York. In all, 194 Army National Guard units were organized for the war against Spain.⁸

National Guard units were mobilized at the end of April 1898. In late June after brief post mobilization training, the first elements of the National Guard deployed to Cuba. The "Rough Riders" were one of the first National Guard units to see combat with active forces. After defeating the Spanish, the Army sent units to seize Puerto Rico. By late July 1898, National Guard infantry units seized San Juan with only minor casualties. The last Spanish formations to be defeated were in the Philippines. The Army sailed from San Francisco and landed in Manila in June 1898. The Army sent a total of 11,000 men to fight in the Philippines. Of the 11,000-man task force, over 7,900 (11 infantry battalions) were National Guard. As a result of their heroism while defeating the Philippine Insurrection, National Guard Infantrymen were awarded a total of 20 Medals of Honor.

With political pressure back in the United States to bring the National Guard home, the active Army asked for volunteers to sign an enlistment for two years. Sufficient numbers of National Guardsmen stayed on active duty and the Philippines were eventually seized.⁹

There was great controversy concerning the conduct of the war against Spain. Issues included force structure, the Army's difficulty in managing joint operations, and the mobilization and application of National Guard units. The Secretary of War, Elihu Root, conducted an analysis and implemented changes in the Army. He raised the standing Army from 27,000 to 88,619 men. He created a modern general staff system and implemented an education system for the officer corps, including the formation of the Army War College for senior Army leaders.

Secretary Root further understood the relevance of the National Guard and the vital role they played during the Spanish-American War. However, there were those who did not agree with Secretary Root.¹⁰

Prior to the Spanish American War in 1875, Major General Emory Upton, a West Point graduate and Civil War hero, was tasked to travel the world and bring back information on how armies in Europe and Asia operated. Upton brought back the same ideas for changes that were eventually introduced by Secretary Root except for how to use the National Guard. MG Upton disliked the National Guard and felt they were “amateurish that only complicated war with their failures in combat.” Major General Upton suggested that the National Guard be confined to a “minor domestic role”.

By 1903 the states’ militia had reformed, with a total strength at 116,542. Still, these early Guardsmen drilled without federal pay and in some units paid dues just to be a member. On January 21, 1903 the United States passed the “Dick Act” which affirmed the National Guard as the primary organized reserve force. The Dick Act also allowed the National Guard to receive federal funds, equipment, active Army training assistance, and oversight. They were required to drill 24 times a year (without pay) and conduct a 5-day annual training period (with pay). Officers in the National Guard began to slowly integrate into the active Army’s professional schools.¹¹

The Dick Act led to the National Defense Act of 1916. This act guaranteed the state militia as the primary reserve force, gave the President the authority to mobilize the Guard during war or national emergency, and made use of the term “National Guard” mandatory. Lastly, it authorized pay for weekend drill periods and extended the annual training period during the “summer camps”.

By 1917, an era of military growth and modernization was drawing to a close, as the nation began to prepare for two world wars. Even with all the achievements by the Army National Guard in combat since 1898, the “verbal dueling between Guardsmen and Uptonians over the merits of State soldiers continued unabated”.¹²

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD FROM WORLD WAR I TO VIETNAM

World War I saw the largest mobilization of National Guard troops since the Civil War. On July 15, 1917 President Wilson initiated the call up of 400,000 National Guardsmen in response to America’s entry into the war against Germany. The United States also initiated the selective service act and began to draft men from around the country. The National Guard was federalized and broken down into new divisions. In all, the Army National Guard sent 18 infantry

divisions to fight in France. During one year in combat, the National Guard sustained 103,731 killed and wounded.¹³

During the mobilization and subsequent deployment there was conflict between the active Army and the Guard. The active Army's policy of replacing Guard officers with active Army Officers caused tremendous strife between the two organizations. Be it perception or reality, many Guardsmen felt the moves were designed to enhance the active Army's officer corp with "combat commands and glory". Certainly there were senior leaders that did need to be replaced, but there were active duty officers relieved by General Pershing as well. In combat, the National Guard infantrymen proved themselves as equal to their counterparts in the active Army, draftees and European allies. "During World War I, strategically, the Army National Guard was able to supply the United States with thousands of men, who quickly formed, trained and deployed to France. They filled the gap between the initial deployments of the regular Army and the longer buildup of the draftees. The allies could not have defeated Germany as quickly had it not been for the National Guard."¹⁴

During World War II the National Guard mobilized 18 infantry divisions totaling over 300,000 men. Some of these units had several years to train before deployment into combat, while others had almost no time at all. In 1940 two tank battalions, the 192nd and 194th were sent to the Philippines to assist in General MacArthur's defense. It was the efforts of these two battalions and the Filipino Scouts that allowed MacArthur's forces time to withdraw to Corregidor and make a stand. The Americal Division was sent to Guadalcanal in 1942 and assisted the Marines in holding Henderson Field. There are hundreds of examples of Guard infantry units during the WWII that achieved incredible victories.

In 1950 and later in Vietnam, the United States displayed a shift in the policy for mobilization and deployment of the National Guard. During the Korean War, Army National Guard units were mobilized on a smaller scale. Guardsmen were activated mostly as replacements with only one Infantry division, the 40th from California, deploying and fighting as a unit. By the end of the war, the total number of activated National Guardsmen was 138,600. Those activated soldiers served in eight National Guard Infantry divisions.¹⁵ In Vietnam, President Johnson made a conscious decision not to mobilize the National Guard. This was based on his assessment that mobilizing the National Guard would signal intentions to the Soviets and Chinese that might influence their direct intervention in the war. President Johnson did not want a repeat of Korea when China entered the conflict, nor did he want to spark another world war involving both communist superpowers. On July 20, 1965 Secretary of Defense McNamara recommended to President Johnson that he mobilize 235,000 National

Guard and reservists. President Johnson, for the primary reasons listed above, also felt the ground war in Vietnam would be over within a year and forces might still be needed to fight a war in Korea if it were to erupt again. Due to the Tet Offensive and the USS Pueblo incident, a small number of National Guard and reservists were activated in 1968. During the entire Vietnam War, 22,786 Army Guardsmen were mobilized either as fillers or in small units.¹⁶ The only infantry unit used in Vietnam was D Company 151st Infantry from Indiana. This unit was an Airborne-Ranger company that had special jungle warfare training.¹⁷

The policy of not mobilizing the Army National Guard during Vietnam had a tremendous impact on the nation and the Army. The selective service gave the option of deferring the draft if an individual joined the National Guard and served six years. The ranks of the Guard swelled as did the resentment by the active Army who began to view the Guard as a haven for draft dodgers. The mobilization, even though small, “was conducted by OSD and HQDA in a manner of gross ineptitude: the preparation for mobilization was imprudently unsuitable; the conduct of the mobilization was contemptuous; the demobilization was a comedy of errors. And once the forces were mobilized, countless problems were inflicted by the Regular Army-as has been true throughout US history”.¹⁸

DESERT STORM, “THE GREAT CONSPIRACY”?

Controversy about Operation Desert Storm has been a divisive wedge between the active Army and the National Guard for over 13 years. The primary focus of bitter feelings within the Guard concerns the active Army’s mobilization, training, and eventual perceived exclusion from combat of the 48th Separate Infantry Brigade (Georgia), 155th Separate Armored Brigade (Mississippi), 256th Separate Infantry Brigade (Louisiana), and the 2/152nd Armor Battalion (Alabama). It is important to address several important questions without trying to “point fingers”, assess blame, justify perceptions, embarrass a specific individual, or discredit any component. Was there a “conspiracy” amongst a group of senior leaders to delay the mobilization of Guard combat units, and then prolong their training to keep them from entering combat in Iraq? Or did senior leaders misunderstand the capabilities of Guard combat units, have an institutional bias against them, or have political agendas based on resources, equipment and force structure? Regardless of the actual causes, the perception, which for many in the Guard is now reality, is that there was a clandestine effort within OSD and HQDA to keep them out of the fight. Only through thoughtful and intellectual examination, can something positive come from the event.

The end of Vietnam began the era of the Total Force Policy. The author of that policy, General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr, stated, "We have to make our reliance on the Guard and the Reserves real. No longer will the lyrics be any good. If we make it real in the eyes of the reserve components, then it will be real for the country." The "Abrams Doctrine" would shape the National Guard into an organization that supports the policy of force integration.¹⁹

After Vietnam three key trends shaped the military for the next thirty years. Force reduction, end of the draft, and public demands to spend less on defense. In order to remain effective despite these trends, the Army had to rely more heavily on the Army National Guard and reserves. Initially the National Guard was expected to respond to heavier demands for increased preparedness with inadequate resources and older equipment. The "round-out" program, which was started by General Abrams in the 1970's, struggled with scant resources under the administrations of President Gerald Ford and President Jimmy Carter. The round-out concept resulted in designing certain separate brigades in the National Guard to become the third brigade of an active Army division. The Guardsmen would train with their respective round-out division on a consistent basis and have their active counterparts provide training assistance.²⁰ Under the Reagan administration, the total federal budget increased to 1 trillion dollars. From 1980 to 1990, the Army National Guard ranks and equipment swelled to all-time highs. The round-out units were given the new M-1 Abrams main battle tanks (MBT) and M-2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV). The end strength of the Army National Guard was over 450,000 soldiers and comprised ten divisions.²¹ Officer and NCO training was greatly enhanced due to funds enabling them to attend active component schools and serve limited tours with active duty units. The Guard began to participate in rotations at the National Training Center (NTC) and overseas on REFORGER exercises. By 1990 the Army National Guard was perhaps the best trained, equipped, and integrated force since its beginning in 1636.

In August 1990 the United States went to war against Iraq under a United Nations resolution. The Army's reorganization to support the total force policy required the reserves to be activated quickly. The National Guard and reserves from each service were mobilized in significant numbers in late August 1990 (14,500 Air Force, 3,000 Marine Corp, 3,000 Navy, and 25,000 Army National Guard and Army Reserve). Those mobilized were combat support and combat service support units. The combat arms (infantry and armor) were not mobilized and became an issue within the Department of the Army (HQDA) and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).²² Mr. Stephen M. Duncan was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs in 1990. In his book, "*Citizen Warriors*" he discloses several meetings that occurred on August 22, 1990 that would directly impact the mobilization of the Army National Guard's

“round-out” brigades. On August 6, 1990 orders to begin movement of active Army combat units to the Persian Gulf were issued. Among the first to deploy was the 24th Infantry Division (ID), the Army’s rapid deployment heavy force, stationed at Fort Stewart, Georgia. Their round-out third brigade was the Georgia National Guards’ 48th Separate Infantry Brigade (SIB). General Norman Schwarzkopf was the CINC (Commander in Chief) for CENTCOM. General Schwarzkopf did not want the 48th SIB to be mobilized or deploy with the 24th ID. Therefore he deployed the 197th Infantry Brigade from Fort Benning to be the 24th ID’s third brigade. The 48th SIB had the M-1(MBT) the M-2 (BFV) in contrast to the 197th Brigade which had the older M-60A3 MBT and the M113 armored personnel carrier. By deploying the 197th Brigade, training time and cost were increased because the entire brigade had to go through new equipment training when they first arrived in Saudi Arabia.²³

A closed door meeting was called by the Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, and held in his office. Present for this meeting were General Norman Schwarzkopf, Army Secretary Mike Stone, Army Chief of Staff, General Carl Vuono, Director of the Joint Staff, Air Force Lieutenant General Mike Carnes (General Colin Powell’s representative), Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Mr. Stephen Duncan, and Mr. David Addington (political assistant to Secretary Cheney). The opposing views were between General Vuono who wanted to mobilize and deploy the 48th SIB and General Schwarzkopf who was still opposed to using National Guard combat units. A primary concern was the Title 10, US Code issue of how long the Guard could be mobilized under a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC). The statutory limit under the existing condition was 180 days. General Vuono stated that it would take 60 days to train the 48th Brigade, and after allowing for travel time, be able to operate for approximately 90 days in a combat zone. Secretary Stone supported General Vuono in advising the mobilization of the round-out brigades. The round-out brigades were to serve as “early reinforcing” troops for the active combat divisions. Mr. Duncan states that no one in the meeting could present any evidence that the round-out brigades could not meet their deployment schedule. Mr. Duncan states that there were suspicions among National Guard leadership that Army leadership and General Colin Powell were seeking ways to avoid using the reserve components and to justify shifting resources back to the active component. He states he advised Secretary Cheney “not using the 48th Brigade, which was rated among the best of the round-out units, would have dire consequences on future recruiting and retention in the National Guard.” Lastly Mr. Duncan stated at the meeting “if the round-out units were not called up, the person responsible for the decision needed to be able to “bear the burden of proof as to why the plan was not implemented.” Secretary Cheney would not make a decision at the meeting to

activate the round-out brigades.²⁴ A political debate continued to grow behind the scenes, being lead by Senator Sonny Montgomery of Mississippi and Senator Sam Nunn from Georgia, both members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. As the debate raged and political pressure increased, Secretary Cheney drafted a letter on September 18, 1990 stating that his two primary reasons for not activating the round-out brigades was because his senior military advisors had not told him it was necessary to call them up, and the statutory limits imposed “artificial restraints” on their use.²⁵

Even though President Bush had already declared a national emergency, under Section 637b it was not clear if reservist could go past the 180-day limit without further Congressional approval. By October 1990, the statutory issue was solved, allowing for more than 180-day limits on mobilized reserves. Even with this obstacle cleared, Secretary Cheney still would not activate the round-out units. The political debate gained momentum, and on November 30, 1990, over three months after their parent units were given deployment orders, Secretary Cheney activated three Guard round-out brigades. According to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Mr. Duncan, General Schwarzkopf was very angry and “fumed” at General Vuono for his support of activating the round-out units. General Schwarzkopf stated “the deployment of the round-out brigades were a Washington political problem that should not have interfered with his own preferences.”²⁶

National Guard combat units were activated and began to assemble at their individual armories. HQDA sent the 48th Brigade to the NTC and the 155th SAB, 256th SIB, and 2/152nd AR to Fort Hood to conduct their post mobilization training. Ironically the 48th SIB had just completed an NTC rotation in July 1990 just 6 weeks before the 24th ID was activated. The NTC commander, Major General Wesley Clark, stated that the 48th SIB had performed “as well or better than most active component units that have come through”. Yet in January 1991, the 48th SIB arrived at Fort Irwin to revalidate their July 1990 NTC rotation.²⁷

There were many challenges for the Guardsman to overcome, both internally and externally. On February 28th, 1991 MG Wesley Clark validated the 48th Brigade as “combat ready”. Ironically, February 28, 1991 was the same day the ground war ended in Iraq. The 48th Brigade had problems, such as poor junior officer and NCO leadership when they were placed in higher positions of authority than they had been trained to assume. Additionally the 48th SIB worked past the replacement of their brigade commander. Maintenance problems included inability to perform preventative checks and services by the tank and Bradley crews. On the other side, Fort Irwin admitted that they issued worn out equipment that was plagued with problems. To further complicate the issue was the fact that the 48th brigade had not modernized

their logistics by having trained personnel to operate the ULLS-G logistic replacement system. This significantly slowed their ability to obtain parts. The Guardsman complained of too many active Army advisers who “smothered their ability to lead and subverted the chain of command.” These problems caused the perception throughout the National Guard that they received unfair treatment, and the active Army who felt vindicated that the Guardsmen were “amateurs” as they had always claimed.²⁸

In a Senior Officer Oral History, retired General Ed Burba, the FORSCOM Commander during Desert Storm, was asked about the 24th ID and their round-out unit the 48th SIB, and the plan to deploy them after 37 days of post mobilization training. General Burba stated that although that was the plan, there was “never any intention” for that to take place. LTC F. Wilson Myers, the Battalion S-3 of the 2/152nd Armor during their post-mobilization training at Fort Hood, states he “received a call from General Burba’s staff wanting to know the status of an individual tank crew that needed 5 more points to qualify.”²⁹ Was the FORSCOM Commander interested and concerned about the Guards’ effort to meet their validation? Or was it the senior Army leadership’s tracking the progress of Guard combat units with the intent to create more obstacles to prevent their introduction into Iraq?

After the 48th SIB was validated for combat they began the process to demobilize. The Army began their accolades about the “success” of the National Guard combat units. In a ceremony upon the return of the 48th SIB to Georgia, General Burba, among other leaders, gave several speeches to the troops. In General Burba remarks he states, “We were compelled to deploy a heavy division to the crisis area immediately, they were sent expecting high-tech, lethal, unforgiving combat during the first days of their arrival, we always expected the 48th would accompany the 24th on a contingency”.³⁰

In the Congressional Record, General Schwarzkopf testified before the Armed services Committee that “the 48th was ready to go to war if needed, and he would not have hesitated to recommend the 48th Brigade join the other active brigades in Saudi Arabia for combat, if needed”.³¹

The 48th Brigade took 91 days, including travel time and a short Christmas break, to validate at the NTC to conduct brigade level combat operations. Had the Army mobilized the 48th Brigade on August 6, 1990 instead of November 26, 1990, they would have been validated and arrived in Saudi Arabia before January 1991. This would have meant they would have been part of the initial offensive in February 1991 alongside their parent division, the 24th ID.

There was a reserve armor unit that did arrive in Saudi Arabia in January 1991; they were part of the Marine Corp Reserves. The Marine Corp had the older M60A1 Main Battle Tank

(MBT) on active duty. Their reserves had the newer M-1 Abrams MBT. The Marine Reserves trained their armor crewman on the M-1 tank at Gowen Field, in Boise Idaho at the Army National Guard Tank Commanders School. The men were part of B Company, 4th Tank Battalion, from Washington State. They were mobilized on December 5, 1990. After less than 30 days training at 29 Palms, California they deployed to Saudi Arabia and arrived in January 1991. They were part of the first ground offensive on February 24, 1991. In a fierce night engagement, B Company, 4th Battalion, which consisted of fourteen M-1A1 MBTs, surprised a battalion of Iraq tanks. In the ensuing battle, the Marine Reservist destroyed thirty T-72 tanks, four T-55 Tanks, and seven armored personnel carriers.³²

CONCLUSIONS

Army National Guard infantry units have served this nation for 367 years. They have improved over time at every level including tactical, operational, and strategic. In 1898 the National Guard mobilized and fought in the Spanish American War. Had it not been for National Guard infantry units, the Army could not have taken Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. The subsequent Mexican Border crisis, World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam saw the same repeating cycle of National Guardsmen maintaining their pre-war organizations with scant resources, mobilizing and performing well in combat, despite being treated all too often with bias and indifference by their active Army brethren.

The culminating point for the Guard was 1990, after 10 years of modernization, equipment upgrades, and professional education for both officers and NCO's. The Gulf War could have been the biggest turning point in the "Total Force Policy" and the future utilization of National Guard combat units. The 48th Brigades' journey will forever be an emotional issue for many in the Army National Guard. The comments made by General Schwarzkopf and General Burba before and after the war were contradictory and inflammatory. The outcome was that Army National Guard infantry units were not given the opportunity to prove themselves again in combat. The Marine reserves have a different institutional philosophy, and do not have to compete for resources with their active duty counterparts. The example of the tank company of Marine reservists clearly demonstrated that combat units can be maintained in the reserves and deploy to combat with excellent results.

CURRENT OPERATIONS

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks Army National Guard combat units were activated in record numbers. Initially 16 infantry battalions were mobilized for Operation Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom. They completed a 30 day post mobilization model and conducted

installation security missions for potential terrorist high value targets. In most cases the infantry battalions were broken up, deployed without their battalion headquarters, and then remobilized in pieces sometimes up to four separate times. This caused havoc within these units and caused further damage to AC/RC relations. Even with all the problems, Guard infantry soldiers rose to the occasion and successfully completed their missions. In one instance, two companies from the Florida National Guards 53rd Separate Infantry Brigade (Light) mobilized for an installation security mission. After their 30-day validation, they were sent to Iraq to support combat operations in theater. One company from the 124th Infantry was attached to an active Army Special Forces unit and assisted them in combat operations. The 1st Bn, 20th Special Forces Group deployed to Afghanistan and conducted operations there for six months with no issues or deficiencies. However, when the build-up began in Saudi Arabia for Operation Iraqi Freedom, not one of the Army National Guard's 15 enhanced brigades were activated or sent to participate.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO FIX FORCE STRUCTURE

I recommend that the Army National Guard become "lighter", making it a more responsive, relevant, and cost-effective force. Compared to heavy forces, lighter forces require less post-mobilization training, can be deployed faster and with fewer transportation assets, can conduct operations in a broader range of environments, and require less money to equip, maintain, and train. If the active Army is not going to use the heavy forces in the Guard, and after the last two wars (Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom) it is abundantly clear that their use as heavy units is unlikely, then the Guard should completely drop the M-1 MBT and the M-2 BFV from their force structure. There are 88 infantry battalions currently in the Army National Guard force structure. These can be broken down into "three battalion" brigades. The National Guard armor battalions can be attached to these light brigades as Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RISTA) battalions to increase their internal lethality. Breaking down the current infantry battalions into separate mobile light brigades, would give the active Army access to 42 additional infantry brigades. These modularized brigades should share the same force structure, METL and post-mobilization training plan. They could be activated for missions, attached to any active formation and be self-sufficient in any theater of operations. However they should be activated as a "unit" no lower than battalion size, and when brigade size elements are needed they should be deployed as a separate brigade. Each brigade should be under individual state control while in peacetime. The habit of spreading a brigade organization over three states only confuses the chain of command, and makes resourcing cumbersome and

difficult to manage. Lastly, the employment of National Guard combat units requires combatant commanders to plan for and request their participation in the campaign. They will be more likely to use Guard combat units if it is clear that the Secretary of Defense supports their employment. Establishing a history of appropriately using Guard units in combat is the most effective way for the Secretary of Defense to make such a preference clear.

The preceding recommendations involve a combination of force structure changes and joint/OSD leadership commitment. Though not addressed here, the National Guard must also take measures to increase its own ability to meet future missions with a better-trained and dedicated force of professional citizen-soldiers. Successfully implementing any of these force structure changes will obviously require the participation of HQDA and support from Congress.

In closing, the Army National Guard is as relevant today as it was in 1636. The combat units in the National Guard are an integral part of the "Total Army." By restructuring and realigning infantry units in the Guard as modular light brigades, the Guard will continue to be indispensable. The active Army must understand the capabilities of Guard combat units and know that there is no conspiracy in the National Guard to replace them. The "Desert Storm" paradigms and "bad blood" must be put behind both the National Guard and the active Army. That period of history should be understood and accepted, but not repeated. Everyone in the Army's three components should be held to the "Total Army" standard. The challenges ahead of the United States in the current pitched and protracted war on terrorism dictate that the Army must fight as one force. The war on terrorism is not the platform to pursue different political agendas.

The only way to show there is a "Total Army" is for the active Army to support the use of National Guard brigade-size infantry units, under their own chain of command, in combat. If the active Army does not, then all the statements about good intentions will not matter in the slightest; negative perceptions will continue preventing the Army from reaching its goal of total integration. Again, perception is reality.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Army National Guard, "Constitutional Charter of the Guard", 8 August 2003; available from <http://www.arng.army.mil/history/Constitution/>; Internet; accessed 23 August 2003.

² Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Transformation Planning Guidance," (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2003), 4-5.

³ COL Larry D. Jayne, "The Infantry Force," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Ft. Benning, U.S. Army Infantry School, 10 July 2001.

⁴ COL Frank Grass, "Army National Guard Operations," briefing slides with scripted commentary, National Guard Bureau, Washington D.C., 5 May 2003.

⁵ Michael D. Doubler, *I am the Guard: A History of the Army National Guard, 1636-2000* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, Pamphlet No. 130-1, 2001), 331.

⁶ Ibid., 7.

⁷ Ibid., vii.

⁸ Ibid., 129.

⁹ Ibid., 133-135.

¹⁰ Harry A. Gailey, *The War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay* (Novato: Presidio Press, 1997), 30-32.

¹¹ MAJ Don M. Prewitt, "Citizen Soldiers: A History of the Army National Guard", (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College: Ft. Leavenworth, KS 1987), 33-34.

¹² Doubler, 163.

¹³ Ibid., 179.

¹⁴ Ibid., 180-182.

¹⁵ William M. Donnelly, *Under Army Orders: The Army National Guard during the Korean War* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001), ix.

¹⁶ Prewitt, 272-274.

¹⁷ Ibid., 261.

¹⁸ Prewitt, 283.

¹⁹ John R. Groves, MG(R), Crossroads in U.S. Military Capability: The 21st Century U.S. Army and the Abrams Doctrine, The Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the U.S. Army, Arlington, VA 2001), 10.

²⁰ Prewitt, 280.

²¹ Ibid., 291.

²² Stephan M. Duncan, *Citizen Warriors: America's National Guard and the Reserve Forces & the Politics of National Security* (Navato: Presidio Press, 1997), 34.

²³ Les' Melnyk, *Mobilizing for the Storm: The Army National Guard in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (National Guard Bureau Office of Public Affairs Historical Services Division, Washington D.C., 2001), 6.

²⁴ Duncan, 37-40.

²⁵ Melnyk, 12.

²⁶ Duncan, 37.

²⁷ Doubler., 314.

²⁸ Melnyk., 20.

²⁹ LTC F. Wilson Myers, Personal Experience Monograph, "2-152 Armor Battalion (ALARNG) Before and During Operation Desert Shield/Storm", (U.S. Army War College: Carlisle, 1996), 30-31.

³⁰ Ibid., 188.

³¹ Ibid., 204.

³² Melnyk., 13.

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